National Aspirations and Technological Power
During his address on 16 May 2026 to the Indian diaspora in Netherlands, Prime Minister Narendra Modi defined four major aspirations for India. These include, developing as a global manufacturing hub, emerging as a leader in green energy, hosting the Olympic Games, and serving as one of the principal engines of global economic growth[i]. While these goals are often linked to economic growth and development, they are equally pertinent to India’s evolving defence-industrial ecosystem. Realising these goals will be contingent on economic progress, manufacturing capacity and India’s ability to innovate, develop advanced technologies and build complex systems.
Developed countries have validated that economic strength, technological leadership and military capability are deeply interconnected. Industries producing advanced aerospace systems, artificial intelligence, communications networks, electronics and software architectures are often the fountainheads of wider national competitiveness[ii]. For India, the transformation of the defence sector is not simply a matter of national security; it is an essential component of the country’s larger ambition to emerge as a leading technological and manufacturing power.
Changing Character of Warfare
Recent conflicts in Ukraine, West Asia and South Asia have fundamentally altered established assumptions about military power. Modern warfare is increasingly defined by interaction of sensors, networks, precision weapons, electronic warfare systems, cyber capabilities and autonomous platforms. The battlefield has not only evolved as a contest between opposing armies but also between interlocked technological ecosystems[iii].
One of the most noteworthy lessons from current conflicts is the growing importance of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare is now one of the most influential enablers of success in military operations. GPS jamming, signal spoofing, communications disruption, cyber intrusion and spectrum denial are regular features of contemporary combat operations. Platforms that perform remarkably well during demonstrations or peacetime trials are often ineffective when subjected to sustained electronic attack, cyber disruption and operational stress. Resultantly, battlefield effectiveness is no longer determined by the performance of individual systems in isolation but by their ability to survive, adapt and continue functioning under hostile operational conditions. Overlooking battlefield survivability and electronic warfare readiness results in technological complacency[iv].
Battlefield Validation Beyond Demonstrations
An important lesson for India’s growing defence industry is that successful demonstrations cannot substitute for battlefield validation. World over, manufacturers often underline visible performance metrics such as endurance, payload capacity, sensor quality, range and autonomous functionality. While these features are important, recent conflicts have demonstrated that resilience is often more significant than specifications.
A drone capable of extended flight endurance is of little operational value if it loses navigation capability in a GPS-denied environment[v]. Similarly, sophisticated sensors are less useful if communications networks are disrupted or if mission systems fail to function under electronic attack. Modern military systems require realistic testing under operational conditions involving jamming, spoofing, cyber-attacks and spectrum congestion. Such testing is necessary for identifying vulnerabilities before systems are inducted into service. Survivability, resilience and adaptability are now as important as performance itself.
Building Indigenous Capabilities in Critical Technologies
India has made substantial progress in defence manufacturing over the past decade. Improved indigenous capabilities in drones, missiles, radar systems, electronic sensors, aerospace structures and weapons development have driven much of this growth[vi]. The next phase of technological expansion will however require proficiency of capabilities that are often less visible but strategically far more significant.
Modern combat efficacy increasingly depends on anti-jamming navigation systems, resilient communications networks, secure datalinks, advanced signal processing architectures, electronic protection measures and cyber-secure software ecosystems. These technologies determine whether a platform can survive in a hostile environment. Consequently, genuine self-reliance must extend beyond the assembly of hardware to include ownership of the intellectual property, software architecture and critical technologies that underpin operational performance. The challenge for Indian industry is not limited to manufacturing state-of-art platforms but to master the technologies that permit such platforms to survive and operate under combat conditions.
Importance of Design Ownership
Equally important is the distinction between manufacturing capability and technological ownership. While the push for self-reliance has significantly enhanced domestic production, doubts persist on indigenous control over the underlying technologies. In many instances, platforms are assembled domestically using imported subsystems, foreign intellectual property or licensed technologies. While such arrangements can accelerate capability acquisition and contribute to manufacturing growth, they do not always create the technological depth necessary for long-term strategic autonomy.
The significance of such a distinction becomes evident during prolonged conflicts where battlefield conditions evolve rapidly. Drone payloads change, electronic warfare techniques adapt, communication protocols are customised, and countermeasures develop at short intervals. Manufacturers that own design authority and intellectual property can respond quickly by modifying software, redesigning subsystems, and introducing operational improvements. Equipment producers that depend upon externally controlled technologies often find themselves inhibited by supplier timelines, licensing restrictions or limited access to core design architectures.
The most successful defence-industrial ecosystems are not those that manufacture the largest number of platforms but those that possess the ability to innovate continuously during conflict. For India, the challenge entails concurrently increasing indigenous production while developing indigenous design capability[vii]. Genuine technological self-reliance necessitates the ability to modify, upgrade and evolve systems without external dependence. As India seeks to emerge as a global manufacturing hub, success cannot be measured merely by number of systems produced domestically but by the extent to which Indian industry controls the intellectual property, software architecture, engineering expertise and design authority that determine future innovation.
Tejas Mk1A Experience
The ongoing Tejas Mk1A programme offers the clearest illustration of the challenges associated with this transition. Public discourse frequently focuses on production schedules and delivery timelines, creating the impression that manufacturing is the primary bottleneck. The more significant challenge lies elsewhere. The airframe and most major hardware elements of the Mk1A configuration have progressed considerably through development and testing[viii]. The current challenges are centred on systems integration, certification requirements and software maturity. The primary effort involves integrating a complex ecosystem of technologies that includes advanced radar systems, digital flight control computers, mission computers, electronic warfare suites, communication systems and beyond-visual-range weapons.
Modern combat aircraft are largely software-defined systems whose effectiveness depends upon seamless interface of sensors, weapons, communications networks and mission-management architectures. Challenges in integrating weapons, sensors and mission systems exemplify that software and systems-engineering issues are not unusual and often emerge only during advanced flight testing and operational evaluations. Interruptions in delivery of F404-IN20 engines from GE Aerospace, certification requirements, flight-test evaluations, supply-chain disruptions and the integration of indigenous and imported subsystems have also affected production schedules, leading to deferred timelines. Delays in induction timelines have a direct impact on force modernisation plans, replacement of legacy aircraft and the overall pace at which combat capability can be expanded in response to evolving regional security challenges.
Challenges in Systems Integration
The lessons from both the drone debate and the Tejas Mk1A programme point towards a common conclusion. India’s defence-industrial ecosystem is now proficient in designing and manufacturing separate platforms, sensors and weapons. The next stage of development requires an equally strong capability in systems integration as modern defence programmes are transitioning from hardware-centric projects to software-intensive technological ecosystems. Designing individual subsystems such as radars, missiles, electronic warfare suites or communication systems, is only one aspect of capability development. The larger challenge is in ensuring that these systems interact seamlessly, exchange information reliably and perform collectively under operational conditions. This shift from platform development to systems engineering is the defining challenge for next generation of indigenous defence programmes. Future military operations will require unified interface of manned and unmanned platforms, communication networks, artificial intelligence applications, sensors, electronic warfare systems and precision weapons. The ability to integrate these components into coherent operational architectures will increasingly determine military effectiveness.
This challenge is especially important because future programmes like Tejas Mk2, Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, Twin Engine Deck-Based Fighter and next-generation autonomous systems will be considerably more software intensive than current platforms. Their success will depend upon mastery of software assurance, sensor fusion, electronic warfare resilience, cybersecurity and mission-system architecture.
Electronic Warfare as a Design Philosophy
Perhaps the most critical lesson from recent conflicts is that electronic warfare resilience can no longer be treated as a specialised capability added during the later stages of development[ix]. It must be a foundational design philosophy. Future testing regimes should expose platforms to realistic battlefield conditions comprising GPS denial, communications disruption, cyber-attacks and spectrum congestion. Operational evaluations should incorporate electronic warfare specialists, cyber experts, signal intelligence personnel and end users to identify vulnerabilities before induction. Such an approach will ensure that systems are assessed not merely on their technical specifications but on their ability to survive and operate under combat conditions. The future battlefield will incentivise resilience, adaptability and integration rather than individual performance parameters alone.
Implications for India
The apprehensions surrounding drone survivability and electronic warfare resilience reflect the growing agonies of a defence-industrial ecosystem that is transiting from manufacturing platforms to developing integrated combat capabilities. Similar evolutions have challenged other developed nations as well. The key requirement is developing ability to identify, understand and overcome these problems through rigorous testing, technological innovation and continuous learning. Similarly, lessons from the Tejas Mk1A programme too point towards the same strategic reality. India has a defence-industrial base which can design and manufacture advanced military platforms. The next phase of national development requires a shift from platform-centric thinking to software-defined warfare, technological sovereignty, systems integration and operational resilience.
This challenge aligns with Prime Minister Modi’s vision of transforming India into a global manufacturing and technological powerhouse. Advanced manufacturing in the twenty-first century is no longer measured by production capacity. It is judged by the ability to integrate hardware, software, artificial intelligence, communications networks and advanced engineering into globally competitive systems.
Conclusion
The message for Indian defence industry is to move from platform integration to designing integrated technological ecosystems capable of surviving, adapting and prevailing in increasingly contested environments. Countries that master this transition will define the future of military power, industrial competitiveness, and technological leadership. India has already built the foundation. The challenge now is to master the complex integration of technologies that will determine success in the decades ahead.
[i] https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-addresses-the-indian-diaspora-in-the-netherlands/
[ii] https://www.facebook.com/thewire.in/posts/according-to-a-march-2026-report-of-the-stockholm-international-peace-research-i/966885342676161/
[iii] https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/wars-changing-character-and-varying-nature-a-closer-look-at-clausewitzs-trinity/
[iv] https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/signals-before-strikes-electronic-warfare-in-the-iran-war
[v] https://idsa.in/publisher/israel-iran-war/drones-in-israel-us-iran-war-key-takeaways-2
[vi] https://www.ddpmod.gov.in/
[vii] https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2114546®=48&lang=2
[viii] https://idrw.org/100-confident-on-tejas-mk1a-deliveries-this-year-secretary-of-defence-production/
[ix] https://idrw.org/amca-internal-systems-design-enters-critical-phase-as-ada-issues-key-engineering-contracts/
Brigadier (Retd) Preet Pal Singh, AVSM, VSM is an Army veteran with over 35 years of distinguished service. After retirement, he served as a Senior Research Fellow at a leading national think tank focused on defence and strategic affairs. He currently holds a senior corporate leadership role overseeing security architecture and risk management, while also contributing regularly to defence discourse as a speaker and writer.